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EXPANDING BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION TO THE
INDIVIDUAL BUSINESSMAN: TAKING CHAPTER 12
ONE STEP FURTHER
The individual businessman involved in a substantial enterprise
cannot practically reorganize under the existing Bankruptcy Code.
While the Code provides both consumer debtors and large corpo-
rations with a mechanism for restructuring their debts and contin-
uing an on-going concern, it does not address the needs of individ-
ual businessmen with large business structures. Congress recently
responded to this gap in the Code by enacting a new Chapter 12
designed to provide individual farmers with the chance to reorgan-
ize. This Comment argues that Congress should expand this newly
afforded protection to all individual bankrupts, including those
outside of the farming industry, so that the Code will more accu-
rately reflect the needs of today's business community.
INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Code' provides individual businessmen with a
chance to reorganize.2 Businesses that cannot revive, or choose not to
try, can liquidate under Chapter 73 of the Code. Otherwise, title 11
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE & CONG. ADMIN. NEWS 5787 (enacting I! U.S.C. § 101-
151326 (1982)), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified at scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and
28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code or Code].
2. The Code has two primary purposes: 1) reorganization, a procedure which
gives the bankrupt a chance to restructure a business' finances so that it may continue to
operate, provide jobs, pay its creditors and produce a return for shareholders; and 2)
liquidation, a procedure that equitably distributes the assets of the debtor among his
creditors. See 5 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY §§ 1100.01, 1300.01 (15th ed.
1986); see also Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CI.
L. REV. 565 (1950).
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Liquidation involves the col-
lection, liquidation and distribution of the property of the debtor and culminates in the
discharge of the debts of the bankrupt. 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at § 700.01.
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twice provides the debtor with the opportunity for a reorganization
proceeding, under Chapters 11 and 13.4 However, neither chapter
adequately addresses the problems or financial circumstances of the
individual debtor5 operating a large business.
Chapter 11 focuses on financially debilitated corporations. 6 It is a
costly7 and time consuming process requiring compliance with a
cumbersome set of statutory provisions." Individual businessmen find
it needlessly complex and ill-suited for their particular financial situ-
ations. The Chapter 13 proceeding is designed for the individual in
need of reorganization.' Yet low unsecured and secured debt re-
quirements of $100,000 and $350,000,10 respectively, significantly
restrict eligibility for protection under this chapter. Therefore, indi-
vidual debtors conducting substantial business enterprises are
trapped between two bankruptcy chapters that substantively ignore
their unique circumstances. These debtors generally fail to qualify
for Chapter 13 and cannot practically reorganize under Chapter 11
because of its corporate-oriented focus.
The effect has been devastating for the individual businessman,
particularly in the farming industry.11 Recent economic develop-
ments in the agricultural markets have compounded the problem,
forcing family farmers into bankruptcy at an alarming rate. Unable
to reorganize under Chapter 11 or 13, these farmers have found
mandatory liquidation to be their only alternative. Congress, con-
cerned about the farmers vanishing from America's economy, moved
to deflect their ebb with the enactment of the Family Farmer Bank-
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ I 100-1330 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Under title II, Chapters
1, 3, and 5 do not offer debtors substantive relief and apply regardless of the chapter
under which the petitioner files. Chapters 7, 9, 11, and 13 offer substantive relief and
have separate and distinct eligibility requirements. See R. GINSBERG, BANKRUPTCY §
1004 (1985).
5. For purposes of this Comment, "businessman," "individual debtor," or
"debtor" will refer to the financial entities that represent their owners' livelihood and sole
means of income; essentially this group consists of noncorporate, nonpublicly held busi-
nesses which do not qualify for Chapter 13, such as closely held businesses, partnerships
and sole proprietorships.
6. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 105 (1983) ("Chapter I I tends to be more
appropriate for larger businesses, because it was designed with them in mind.").
7. Both the legal and filing fees for a Chapter II reorganization continue to
accrue throughout the petitioning period while Chapter 13 proceedings usually cost a flat
rate. See Butenas, Establishing Attorney's Fees Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 37
Bus. LAW. 77 (1981).
8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74. Most notable are the absolute priority rule and ade-
quate protection payments. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
9. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-30; see also 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at § 1300.02
("Chapter 13 is designed to facilitate adjustments of the debts of individuals with regular
income through extension and composition plans funded out of future income, under the
protection of the court.").
10. !1 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982).
i. See Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
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ruptcy Act of 1986.12 The law creates a new Chapter 1213 under title
11 that specifically addresses the family farmer threatened by eco-
nomic hardship. Congress designed the new chapter to keep the fam-
ily farmer in business when circumstances make it a practical and
realistic alternative. 4 However, other individual businessmen are
equally disadvantaged by the narrow focus of the present Code. Con-
gress needs to provide adequate bankruptcy relief for all individual
businessmen, not just family farmers or other restricted classes. In-
stead of devising piecemeal legislation to cure the problems that
haunt federal bankruptcy statutes, Congress should amend the Code
to make it responsive to those business entities that need and deserve
bankruptcy protection. Such an amendment remains consistent with
the Code's clear policy of resuscitating viable business enterprises,
rather than ending them, whenever it is practical to do so.15 More-
over, since the amendment can be structured in a way that visits no
additional hardship upon the debtor's creditors, it represents an ex-
pedient and attractive solution to the problem.
This Comment will briefly trace the development of the existing
Bankruptcy Code in order to illustrate the origin and nature of the
problem confronting individual businessmen. The Comment will then
examine how individual debtors are treated under both Chapter 11
and Chapter 13 proceedings. Finally, it will analyze the new Chapter
12 and conclude by recommending an amendment that would ex-
pand the chapter's eligibility criterion to include all individual debt-
ors who are not addressed by the existing Code.
12. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 1986, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. H8986(daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986). The statute amends title 28 of the United States Code to in-
crease the number of bankruptcy courts and trustees. It also creates a new Chapter 12
which provides substantive bankruptcy relief for the family farmer under title I1. See
Martin, Bankruptcy Judges, U.S. Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986,
16 COLO. LAW. 221 (1987).
13. The amendment to title II adds the following subtitle: "Chapter 12 - Adjust-
ment of Debts of a Family Farmer with Regular Annual Income." H.R. CONF. REP. No.
958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., § 1201-1231, 132 CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986).
14. See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
15. See In re Chugiak Boat Works, Inc., 18 Bankr. 292 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982)
(Bankrkuptcy law's purpose is to prevent those liquidations that are avoidable); Hughes,
Wavering Between the Profit and the Loss: Operating a Business During Reorganization
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 45 (1980).
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THE PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Bankruptcy law first emerged as a means for creditors to foreclose
upon and liquidate hopelessly indebted businesses. 16 Yet, since 1868
the thrust of bankruptcy law has gravitated toward the protection of
the debtor. 17 One primary aim of the current Bankruptcy Code lies
in providing a troubled business with the chance to reorganize and
remain alive as a functioning entity.' Unfortunately, the current
Code has been distilled from various provisions originating in differ-
ent economic eras.19 Consequently, the Code does not adequately re-
flect an understanding of the modern debtor's needs. The problem is
particularly acute for individual debtors, partnerships, and small cor-
porations. Congress chose not to provide these financial entities with
a separate chapter in the current Code, intending instead to consoli-
date all bankruptcy petitions into either Chapter 11 or Chapter 13.20
In short, these entities are unable to practically reorganize under the
present Code because it does not address their unique financial
circumstances.
Prior to the present Code's enactment in 1978, the Bankruptcy
Act2' contained two chapters which specifically applied to the reor-
ganization of the individual debtor - Chapters X12 2 and XII.23 The
chapters recognized the special circumstances surrounding a
noncorporate entity's reorganization; accordingly, they made it possi-
16. The first federal bankruptcy laws were designed to temper the harsh effects of
state "grab laws" - generally considered to be the first bankruptcy laws - which con-
doned the use of coercion and physical force by creditors in effecting debt recovery. 5 W.
COLLIER, supra note 2, at § 1300.01; see also Hearings on H.R. 6434 before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1937). ("Creditors would not merely destroy
going-concern value, they would sometimes literally tear the assets to pieces .. ").
17. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); see also I NORTON
BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 1.02 (W. Norton ed. 1981).
18. Beall v. Picnckn, 150 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1945); in re Cummings, 84 F. Supp.
65 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
19. See generally H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., ch. 5 (1977). For a
discussion of the origin and meaning of the various terms of art in bankruptcy, see 5 W.
COLLIER, supra note 2, §§ 1100.01, 1300.01.
20. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977).
21. Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, bankruptcy law was governed
by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act]. The
Act was repealed by the enactment of the Code. See supra note I.
22. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, §§ 301-399. Chapter XI provided individuals, part-
nerships, and small corporations with a vehicle to negotiate extension or composition
plans with creditors. Although it was intended to be used primarily by the individual
businessman, eligible corporations filed a majority of the petitions under this chapter. See
5 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at § 1100.01.
23. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, §§ 401-526. Chapter XII was created to deal with
the specific type of debtor involved in real estate during the aftermath of the Great De-
pression. Congress contemplated the protection of individual debtors confronted with nu-
merous creditors of the same class possessing varying viewpoints and positions incapable
of reaching an agreement. See In re Pine Gate Assocs., 10 C.B.C. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1976);
Merrick & Bufithis, Chapter XII - Why Is It?, 52 Am. BANKR. L.J. 213 (1978).
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ble for the debtor to remain in possession of his business during the
critical rebuilding period.24 Unfortunately, the chapters ultimately
failed to provide the individual debtor with adequate bankruptcy re-
lief, as evidenced by the enactment of the current Code.25 However,
the fact that Congress created these chapters strongly suggests its
recognition that these debtors need some special form of financial
protection distinct from that available to corporate entities.
Corporations filing for bankruptcy did so under Chapter X26 of the
Act. The chapter contained a series of provisions uniquely tailored to
the corporate structure. Most notably, a Chapter X reorganization
had to be "fair and equitable" with respect to all of the creditors
involved in the debted business. 28 But the Act did not define what
constituted fair and equitable treatment, 9 leaving that task to the
judiciary. The Supreme Court chose to apply a rigid test to deter-
mine whether or not a particular reorganization plan was fair and
equitable. One aspect of the test, the absolute priority rule,30 made
24. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 249 (1977). In addition, the chap-
ters offered "simplicity and flexibility" during the filing period which greatly expedited
the entire process. 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at § 1100.01.
25. The primary problem with Chapter XI was the ambiguity surrounding its
eligibility requirements. Corporations looking for a uncomplicated proceeding tried to
squeeze their petitions in notwithstanding the fact that a Chapter X proceeding was
clearly more appropriate. An overwhelming mass of litigation concerning each peti-
tioner's eligibility resulted. 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at § 1100.01. The problem with
Chapter XII is discussed supra note 23.
26. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, §§ 101-276.
27. The painstaking process of a Chapter X filing included compliance with a
number of provisions that, taken together, were tantamount to relinquishing control of
the corporate entity. As described in a Senate debate,
Chapter X mandates that, first, an independent trustee be appointed and as-
sume management control from the officers and directors of the corporation;
second, the Securities and Exchange Commission must be afforded an opportu-
nity to participate both as an advisor to the court and as a representative of the
interests of public security holders, third the court must approve any proposed
plan of reorganization, and prior to such approval, acceptances of creditors and
shareholders may not be solicited; fourth, the court must apply the absolute
priority rule; and fifth, the court has the power to affect and grant the debtor a
discharge in respect of, all types of claims ...
5 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at § 1100.01 (quoting floor statements of Sen. DeConcini,
124 CONG. REc. § 17,417-419 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
28. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 221(2).
29. The Act does not specifically define what constitutes fair and equitable treat-
ment. This omission resulted in a great deal of confusion in subsequent bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. Judicial interpretation gradually gave form to this term of art. Consolidated
Rock Prod. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
30. The absolute priority rule was first articulated by the Court in Northern Pac.
Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913); 3 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 63.21 (W. Norton
ed. 1981). See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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the corporation's compliance with the Act extremely difficult31 and
effectively chilled its usefulness as a means of reorganization for the
corporate debtor. The creation of the Code is testimony to the inade-
quacy of the Act and Chapter X.
The new Code streamlines the bankruptcy process by consolidat-
ing the previous Chapters X, XI, and XII together into the present
Chapter 11. 32 Under the Code, Congress opted not to delineate be-
tween individual businessmen and corporations. Instead, both busi-
ness entities are eligible for Chapter 11. In formulating the Chapter,
however, Congress seems to have concentrated exclusively on the
corporate entity.33 Chapter 11 contains a modified version of the ab-
solute priority rule and other protective measures geared toward cor-
porate bankruptcy. 34 Meanwhile the expedient features of Chapters
XII and XIII, 5 which specifically dealt with individuals, have been
excluded. Congress intended to shield creditors from shareholder
fraud and abuse through the inclusion of these corporate-oriented
rules. However, the practical effect has been to seriously impair the
individual businessman's ability to reorganize. Simply stated, since
such entities cannot comply with the complicated provisions of
Chapter 11 they are frequently forced to settle out of court or liqui-
date instead.36
Therefore, the present Code's failure to distinguish between indi-
vidual businessmen and corporations lingers as a continuing problem
for the noncorporate debtor in need of bankruptcy relief. In order to
highlight the nature of the problem, an analysis of the individual's
treatment under the present Code is necessary.
31. The absolute priority rule was forged in an era when shareholder fraud posed
a serious threat to creditors' interests. The rule therefore required that no shareholder
could be paid anything from the assets of the debted business until all creditors were paid
first. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 508. In addition, the corporation had to undergo several valua-
tion proceedings and pay expensive filing fees. See Blum & Kaplan, The Absolute Prior-
ity Doctrine in Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651, 658 (1974).
32. 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at § 1100.01.
33. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977). ("Chapter I1, reorganiza-
tion, is primarily designed for businesses, but permits individuals to use the Chapter. The
procedures of Chapter 11, however, are sufficiently burdensome that their use will only
make sense in the business context, and not in the [sole proprietorship] context.").
34. See 3 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. supra note 30, at § 49.04.
35. Chapter XIII was designed to allow individuals with regular income (con-
sumer debtors) to adjust their debts by making payments to their creditors over a period
of time. It is expanded in Chapter 13 of the Code to allow a debtor to keep his business
or job while repaying creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330. See infra notes 91-92 and ac-
companying text.
36. Although the Code encourages settlement, the outcome is never equitable
when it becomes mandatory for the debtor. See Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. LAw. 441 (1984).
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INDIVIDUAL BUSINESSMEN UNDER THE PRESENT CODE
Chapter II
While the tenor of Chapter 11 is distinctly corporate, individual
debtors are eligible for its protection under section 109.7 Under a
Chapter 11 proceeding, a debtor files a business reorganization plan
with the bankruptcy court. 38 The basic goal of any plan is to make
the necessary adjustments in the business operation and capital
structure so that the business can continue to function. 9 A plan
must meet each of eleven provisions set forth in 11 U.S.C. section
1129(a) before the court may confirm it.40 Most notably, it must be
approved by all of the debtor's impaired creditors.4 Unanimous
creditor approval of a plan will allow a court to confirm it provided
the other applicable requirements are satisfied.
When one or more creditors within an accepting class 42 objects to
37. II U.S.C. § 109.
38. The bankruptcy petition will trigger an "automatic stay" which restrains
creditors from engaging in "any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the
debtor which arose before the commencement of the case." The stay, in fact, prohibits
the debtor from paying his creditors until the court determines otherwise. 1I U.S.C. §
362(a).
39. Id. § 1123. This section, "Contents of a Plan," enumerates the minimum re-
quirements that a plan must meet before it can be considered for approval. See also id. §
1121(c) ("Who May File a Plan" - plan may be filed by any party in interest subject to
the conditions of the Code).
40. Id. § 1129(a). Confirmation of a plan requires that a plan be proposed in
good faith and be feasible. In addition, § 1129(a)(7) requires that a plan provide the
following:
(7) With respect to each impaired class of claims or interest -
(A) each holder of a claim or interest or such class -
(i) has accepted the plan; or
(ii) will receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim or interest
property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the
amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liqui-
dated under chapter 7 of this title on such date:...
(8) With respect to each class of claims or interests -
(A) such class has accepted the plan; or
(B) such class is not impaired under the plan.
Id. § 1129(a)(7).
41. At the outset of the bankruptcy proceeding creditors will be categorized as
possessing claims that are either "impaired" or "unimpaired." Unimpaired creditors have
been paid in full by the effective date of the plan. In fact, their claims are extinguished
by the debtor's satisfaction of them. Unimpaired creditors have no voice in the subse-
quent proceeding and are presumed to have accepted the plan.
A claim that cannot be categorized as unimpaired will be considered "impaired." Im-
paired claims that have not voted for acceptance are considered dissenting and thereby
evoke the fair and equitable test. Id. §§ 1122, 1124, 1129(a)(10).
42. Creditors will be grouped into "classes" and treated accordingly when their
claims against the debtor are "substantially similar." Id. § 1122(a).
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the reorganization plan, the plan can be "crammed down" - con-
firmed in spite of the creditor's objection - if the "best interest of
the creditors" test is satisfied.4 3 This test, set forth at section
1129(a)(7)(A), requires that the dissenting creditor receive at least
as much from the plan as he would if the debtor were liquidated at
that time instead of reorganized. 44 Since a debtor's plan usually pro-
vides each creditor with deferred payments totaling more than the
claim would be worth in an immediate liquidation, this test rarely
presents a problem.
When an entire class of creditors objects to the debtor's plan, con-
firmation becomes more problematic.45 A court will issue confirma-
tion only if the plan satisfies the strict statutory requirements for
"cram down" set forth at section 1129(b). 46 The court must deter-
mine that, regarding the dissenting class, 47 the plan "does not dis-
criminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable .... "48 The Code spec-
ifies the test the court must apply in making this evaluation. It
addresses each class of creditors differently, depending on the nature
and priority of the claims.49
43. The best interest of the creditors test concerns the situations where one credi-
tor within an accepting class objects to the plan. It must be distinguished from the fair
and equitable test which applies when an entire class objects to a plan. Id. §
1129(a)(7)(A), (b)(2).
44. Since liquidation is the alternative to the proposed reorganization plan, credi-
tors either will be provided for in the plan or will take what they can from the liquidation
of the business. Therefore, when a creditor will receive from the plan at least as much as
it would from a liquidation, the court will consider the plan to be in the creditor's best
interest. The dissenting creditor will be compelled to accept the decision of the class
majority. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). See 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at § 1129.02(a).
45. A class can be a single creditor under § 1122. In such a case, the creditor is
empowered with the rights of an entire class. In other words, one creditor's objection to a
plan can require the debtor to comply with the fair and equitable test for cram down,
instead of the easier best interest test generally intended to be applied when a single
creditor objects to a plan. See infra note 46.
46. 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at § 1129.03(3)(a). For a discussion of the gen-
eral history and significance of the term "cram down," see generally Broude, supra note
36; Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, 32 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 301 (1982); Pachulski, The Cram Down and Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C.L. REV. 925 (1980); Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know
About Cram Down Under the Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979).
47. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 141, n.6 (1977). A debtor facing a
dissenting class of creditors must request a cram down as the court cannot consider this
alternative sua sponte.
48. 11 U.S.C. § I129(b)(2).
49. The fair and equitable test differs depending upon whether the claims are
secured or unsecured. Secured claims are those supported by some collateral within the
debtor's possession. Unsecured claims are those not related to any tangible property and
are considered junior to secured claims. Unsecured claims are ranked according to § 507
and prioritizied in that order. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506-507; see also U.C.C. § 9-312 (1977).
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Secured Creditors
With respect to a class of secured creditors, a plan is fair and
equitable when it provides that each creditor (1) retains its lien on
the collateral 50 and receives a note from the debtor for deferred cash
payments totaling the amount of the value of the collateral which
secures the claim, 51 or (2) receives the "indubitable equivalent" of
his claim.52 If the plan anticipates a sale of the collateral, the se-
cured party's lien must attach to the proceeds of such sale. In
short, a debtor seeking cram down over a class of secured creditors
must provide the secured creditors with an amount totaling no less
than the value of their collateral.
A recent Ninth Circuit decision, In re American Mariner Indus-
tries 5 4 further complicates the confirmation of a debtor's plan. The
holding in that case interprets the iCode's "adequate protection '55
language to mean that debtors must pay secured creditors interest on
their collateral from the time the petition is filed until it is con-
firmed. Because the filing of a Chapter 11 petition triggers an auto-
matic stay56 which prevents the creditor from foreclosing upon the
50. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(1); see also Booth, The Cramdown on Secured
Creditors: An Impetus Toward Settlement, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69 (1985).
51. 11 U.S.C. § I 129(b)(2)(A)(i)(l). Often the collateral which secures the claim
has depreciated in value and is worth considerably less than the creditor's claim. In such
a case, the creditor's claim will be bifurcated into a secured and unsecured interest
against the debtor. For example, a debtor with property valued at $1 million securing a
loan for $1.2 million must issue a valid note and property lien to the creditor for $1
million. The additional $200,000 can be pursued by the creditor as an unsecured claim.
52. Id. § ! 129(b)(2)(A)(iii). The term "indubitable equivalent" is not statutorily
defined. Judge Learned Hand first used the term in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Murel
Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935), where he discussed the need to ensure that
creditors received "adequate protection" under the Code:
It is plain that "adequate protection" must be completely compensatory; and
that payment ten years hence is not generally the equivalent of payment now.
Interest is indeed the common measure of the difference, but a creditor who
fears the safety of his principal will scarcely be content with that; he wishes to
get his money or at least the property. We see no reason to suppose that the
statute was intended to deprive him of that in the interest of junior holders,
unless by a substitute of the most indubitable equivalence.
Id. at 942.
53. 11 U.S.C. § I129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
54. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984). For a discussion of the problems expressed by
the Eighth Circuit in deciding what is required by "adequte protection," see Note, Lost
Opportunity Cost to Undersecured Creditors: The Shifting Sands of the Eighth Circuit
Position, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 411 (1987).
55. !1 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
56. A stay automatically goes into effect when a Chapter II petition is filed. 11
U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). This section lists the actions against the debtor
that are rendered illegal by the imposition of the stay. The rationale behind the stay is to
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assets of the debtor, the creditor must be compensated. The court in
American Mariner held that the impact the automatic stay has on
creditors must be tempered with a provision that protects their inter-
est. Accordingly, debtors must tender interest payments to creditors
based on the value of the securing collateral.17 Because a debtor gen-
erally needs to keep the property and equipment that secures his
loans for the continued operation of the reorganized business, the
debtor necessarily faces an expensive payment schedule in order to
comply with the adequate protection payment requirement. 8
UNSECURED CREDITORS - THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE
With respect to a class of unsecured creditors, the fair and equita-
ble test requires that the plan satisfy one of two standards set forth
in section 1129(b)(2)(B). 59  The first alternative, section
1129(b)(2)(B)(i), permits confirmation where each member of the
dissenting class receives full payment for his or her claim. 0 Full
payment converts the unsecured impaired claim into an unimpaired
claim, thereby obviating the need for that class' approval.61 Most
debtors in bankruptcy are unable to employ this alternative since
their inability to repay their debts in full is the very reason they need
to reorganize.
The other alternative is section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), which codifies
the absolute priority rule.6" To satisfy this rule, no creditor junior to
the dissenting class of creditors can receive anything under the plan
until all senior creditors have been paid in full. 63 The court will look
at the list of creditors as "a ladder of prioritized claims. If any credi-
tor on the priority ladder objects to the plan, cram down will issue
only if no other creditors beneath the dissenting creditor receive
anything.64
give the debtor an opportunity to articulate a workable plan, and to prevent creditors
from obtaining preferential treatment over one another by acting quickly.
57. I1 U.S.C. § 361.
58. Depending on. the discount rate selected by the court, a debtor may face
monthly payments of several thousand dollars. The strains such payments pose for a
debtor struggling to regain solvency are obvious.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
60. Id. § l129(b)(2)(B)(i).
61. See supra note 41.
62. II U.S.C. § I129(b)(2)(B)(ii); see also 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at §
1129.03 (3)(e).
63. The owners of a debted business, whether many shareholders or one individ-
ual, are always last on the creditor ladder. Any claim or interest that the owner asserts
against the business is junior to all other creditors' claims. II U.S.C. § 510 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
64. To facilitate an understanding of the absolute priority rule, one author used
the following example:
As a model, one might think of the going concern value [the debtor's busi-
ness] as sand and various creditor and ownership interests as boxes aligned
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The absolute priority rule was designed to prevent shareholders
and other owners of the debted business from retaining an equity
interest in the reorganized business entity without first fully extin-
guishing the debts of the business.8 5 Congress felt that debtors
should not be allowed to discharge their debts at bargain rates while
keeping their own interests intact.6 6 In a corporate context, the rule
serves its purpose. Since the owners of the bankrupt business are
stockholders, a divestment of their interest is neither unexpected nor
tragic given the business' insolvency. When applied to the individual
debtor, however, the rule operates to make cram down virtually
impossible.
The thrust of the problem lies in the businessman's need to remain
on his property or involved with his business in order to implement
the reoganization plan.67 Since the business represents the individ-
ual's livelihood, his plan invariably envisions his management of the
business throughout the rebuilding process. In fact, the debtor's con-
tribution often represents an indispensable part of the plan's success.
Yet the debtor's participation in the business can be perceived as a
retention of an equity interest which violates the absolute priority
rule. 8 In In re East,69 the bankruptcy court held that even where the
interest retained by the debtor had "negative value," the individual's
possession of it violated the absolute priority rule.70
according to their order of priority .... Under the fair and equitable rule a
plan must provide that the going concern value, that is, the sand in our model,
is poured into boxes in their order of priority and no box junior to a senior box
may receive any sand unless the prior box is filled or its owner has agreed to
accept less than full payment."
Carr, When Can the Owners Participate in the Reorganized Debtor?; Cram Down as a
"Shield"for Creditors, 15 IND. L. REV. 547, 554 (1982).
65. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 482 (congressional concern over the potential abuse of such
a provision was echoed in the Court's language: "A transfer by stockholders from them-
selves to themselves cannot defeat the claim of a nonassenting creditor."); see also 3
NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC., supra note 30, at § 63.22.
66. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 222 (1977).
67. See generally Carr, supra note 64.
68. In some cases a plan can propose the creation of a corporation which essen-
tially will be the same business but owned by the debtor's creditors. If the corporation
hires the debtor to manage the business, then the debtor's participation would not violate
the absolute priority rule. The debtor would merely be an employee of the creditors who
owned the corporation. Obviously creditor approval is a prerequisite for such a situation
to materalize.
69. 57 Bankr. 14 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985).
70. Id. at 18. In In re East the debtor was forced to relinquish his business even
though it was of "negative value," since his creditors objected to his reorganization plan.
The court noted that the absolute priority rule does not bend when a debtor retains an
interest that is not "valuable" or "substantial." Instead, the rule stipulates that "[tihe
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In other words, when a creditor objects to a reorganization plan,
the plan cannot be crammed down if it provides that the junior most
creditor, the petitioning debtor,7 1 gets an interest before all senior
creditors are paid in full. Unless the creditors are paid in full, or
they unanimously consent to the plan, the debtor will not be able to
retain an interest in the business, even if that interest can be charac-
terized as nothing more than continued participation in the business.
The absolute priority rule does not differentiate between a re-
tained interest held by a corporate shareholder and a retained inter-
est held by an individual businessman. Arguably, the rule applies
equitably to the shareholder who seeks to retain cash from the pub-
licly held business. It is generally agreed that a stockholder should
not be permitted to redeem his stock for value while the bankrupt
business still has outstanding claims against it. Conversely, the busi-
nessman only desires to continue working and operating his business.
His retained equity interest is merely the continued operation of his
business and livelihood. While the two interests are dramatically dif-
ferent, they are treated the same under the Code. 72 Therefore, any
plan proposed by an individual which contemplates his continued in-
volvement in the business operation cannot be crammed down.7 3 The
devastating consequence for the individual debtor is that one recalci-
trant class of creditors can destroy an entire reorganization plan
merely by objecting to it.
Recent cases have recognized the hardships the absolute priority
rule poses for individual businessmen engaged in a Chapter 11 pro-
ceeding. 4 Unfortunately, the inflexible nature of the rule mandates a
strict application of it in all cases. In In re Witt,75 the court reluc-
tantly forced an individual debtor to liquidate his business in spite of
his ardent desire to work out a plan and a perceived ability to do so
successfully. The court noted that it "does not believe the absolute
priority rule is appropriate in [individual debtor's] bankruptcies and
realizes that it makes [individual debtor's] reorganizations extremely
difficult. Nevertheless, it is clearly the law, as the Bankruptcy Code
and case law indicate, and if the law is to be changed. [sic] Congress
must do So. ' '71
plan cannot be crammed down if the [debtor] receives or retains any property." Id. (em-
phasis added).
71. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
72. 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 2, at § 1100.01; see supra note 33.
73. For an exception, see infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
74. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Witt, 60 Bankr. 556 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1986).
75. 60 Bankr. 556 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986).
76. Id. at 560. The Witt court was referring to agricultural bankruptcies. How-
ever, this Comment recognizes that a sole proprietorship is nearly identical to the family
farm as a business entity.
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Under certain circumstances, however, courts have recognized an
exception to the absolute priority rule.77 When owners inject a "sub-
stantial" amount of new capital into the debted business, a new in-
terest can be created.7 8 The owners can retain this new equity inter-
est in the business based on the value of their contribution even
though some creditor's claims remain outstanding.7 9 In Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Products Co.,80 the Supreme Court set forth the
conditions that allow a debtor to acquire a new equity interest based
on an investment of fresh capital. Generally, the new money must be
essential to the success of the enterprise, and the resulting retained
interest must be "reasonably equivalent" to such contribution.81
In a corporate context, this exception to the absolute priority rule
is practical. Shareholders of publicly held corporations rarely have
all of their assets locked up in one corporation. Generating the fresh
capital to validate a new interest generally does not pose an impossi-
ble burden for them, especially if they have maintained a diverse
portfolio. Yet an individual businessman does not have the same ac-
cess to new capital. His assets are tied up in his business, which
usually represents his exclusive source of income. Thus, the financial
constraints that bind the sole proprietor make his use of the "fresh
capital" exception established in Case nearly impossible. As the
court in East stated, "[I]t is easier in a corporate context to consider
the concept of the injection of outside capital; when an individual is
involved, it is difficult to imagine the source of such funds ... "81
Clearly the articulation of this precedent does not make the absolute
priority rule any more palpable for the individual debtor in
bankruptcy.
With the exception of a recent Eighth Circuit decision, no court
has approved an individual debtor's retention of any equity interest
based on a new capital contribution. 3 In In re Ahlers s4 the court
77. See, e.g., In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Potter Material
Serv., Inc., 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308
U.S. 106 (1939).
78. Potter, 781 F.2d at 101.
79. Id.; see also In re Marston Enters., 13 Bankr. 514, 518 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1981). ("There is no statutory prohibition against original shareholders making a sub-
stantial necessary capital contribution in consideration for which they receive shares of
stock in the reorganized corporation.")
80. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
81. Id. at 121-27.
82. East, 57 Bankr. at 19. The court rejected petitioner's argument that since
individuals cannot give up their future interests in the debted business as stockholders
can by cancelling their shares, the exception is effectively denied to individuals. Id. at 18.
83. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986).
84. Id.
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held that an individual's plan that proposed he make a substantial
contribution of time and expertise in managing his business' reorgan-
ization was sufficient to meet the standard promulgated in Case.85 In
Case, the court indicated that the value of a contribution had to be
"money or money's worth."86 The Ahlers court considered the
debtor's labor skills and trade knowledge exercised in conjunction
with the management of his farm to be intangible assets of signifi-
cant and definable value. In turn, the debtors were permitted to re-
tain an interest in the business and continue as an on-going concern
based on that contribution and in spite of the fact that an objecting
creditor did not receive full payment. 8
7
The Ahlers decision seems to express a judicially perceived need
to fabricate an exception to the present Code's harsh consequences.
Yet, while allowing a debtor to keep his business against the de-
mands of an intransigent and unreasonable creditor seems applaud-
able, it is clearly not the law. As the Ahlers dissent noted, "this rea-
soning works an expansion of the rule of absolute priority that is
unprecedented, illogical, and unfair.""" The dissent felt that the judi-
ciary should not carve out a complicated exception to the Code in
framing a remedy for the individual debtor with a reorganization
plan ensnarled in the absolute priority rule. The better approach is,
as this Comment argues, to amend the Bankruptcy Code so that the
absolute priority rule applies only to corporate debtors.
Chapter 13
While Chapter 13 is specifically aimed at the individual debtor's
financial rehabilitation,89 it is not a comprehensive subtitle. Essen-
tially, Chapter 13 provides individual debtors with a mechanism for
refinancing their debts without completely disgorging their interests
or rights in their businesses. The chapter works well for the con-
sumer debtor for which it was designed. Small businessmen are able
to keep their businesses while gradually paying off creditors. Yet the
eligibility criterion for Chapter 13 is so narrow that individual debt-
ors involved in a substantial enterprise are excluded from the chap-
85. Id. at 402. ("Certainly, a farmer's efforts in operating and managing his farm
is essential to any successful farm reorganization, and this yearly contribution is measur-
able in money or money's worth. . . . Accordingly, the farmer should be entitled to par-
ticipate in the plan to the extent of this contribution .... ").
86. Case, 308 U.S. at 122. This language seems to indicate an intention to leave
open the possibility that something other than money would be sufficient to constitute a
fresh capital contribution.
87. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 404-05 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 406.
89. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330, 109. See W. DRAKE & J. MORRIS, CHAPTER 13
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3.01-3.10 (1986); 3 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC., supra
note 30, at § 68.01.
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ter's coverage.9"
Individuals operating a large enterprise need the type of protection
available to Chapter 13 debtors, 91 but invariably fail to qualify be-
cause of the chapter's low debt requirement. Devoid of any other
alternative for reorganizing, individual businessmen turn to Chapter
11 where they face the thorny provisions discussed above. Conse-
quently, individual debtors are forced to settle with creditors out of
court or liquidate their businesses completely.
Congress recently acknowledged the dilemma of a certain class of
individual businessmen by enacting a new chapter designed to re-
solve the Code's inadequacies with respect to those in the farming
profession. The new Chapter 12 provides the family farmer with a
customized set of provisions that recognizes the unique circum-
stances of the individual debtor in need of bankruptcy relief.92 Most
notably, the new chapter excludes the absolute priority rule, because
Congress recognized the rule to be inappropriate in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings involving a noncorporate debtor.93
CHAPTER 12: THE FARMERS' HYBRID
The Bankruptcy Code's narrow focus has had a catastrophic im-
pact on the farming industry. In recent years, struggling farmers
have been hit from all sides: competition from abroad, high taxes
90. In accordance with the other provisions of Chapter 13, a petitioner must file a
plan that proposes to pay off creditors for the full value of their claims through deferred
payments over a three-year period. Creditors receive these payments through a court-
appointed trustee. At the conclusion of the three-year period, the debts are discharged.
However, a Chapter 13 plan can be confirmed by the court even if it does not propose to
pay all creditors the full value of their claim. In such a case, the debtor must assign all of
his "disposable income" to his creditors in addition to making the scheduled payments.
Disposable income is defined in § 1325(a)(2) as earnings which are not reasonably neces-
sary for the maintenance or support of the debtor, or for "the expenditures necessary for
the continuation, preservation, and operation of such business." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2);
see also 3 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC.. supra note 30, at §§ 76.01-76.17.
91. 1I U.S.C. § 109(e). To be eligible for Chapter 13 the debtor must be 1) an
individual, with 2) regular income, and 3) unsecured debts totaling less than $100,00 and
secured debts totaling less than $350,000. See Drake & Morris, Eligibility for Relief
Under Chapter 13, 57 Am. BANKR. L. J. 195 (1983).
92. See supra notes 12-13.
93. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 CONG. REc. H8999
(daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986). The chapter was designed to suit the farmer as a financial
entity. The conference report noted that the new chapter was necessary because farmers
"... have too much debt to qualify as debtors under Chapter 13 and are thus limited to
relief under Chapter I1. Unfortunately, many farmers have found Chapter 11 needlessly
complicated, unduly time consuming, inordinately expensive and, in many cases unwork-
able." Id.
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and an ever-increasing surplus of commodities 4 have combined to
financially squeeze the farmer into insolvency.95 Yet farmers search-
ing for a means to reorganize found no relief under the Bankruptcy
Code.
The new Chapter 12 is specifically designed to resolve this prob-
lem.96 The chapter closely follows the Chapter 13 model allowing
farmers to work out a plan that pays off creditors over a three-year
period.9 7 The absolute priority rule and adequate protection pay-
ments that so eviscerated a farmer's ability to reorganize under
Chapter 11 have been eliminated. 98 Under a Chapter 12 petition,
farmers can propose a plan that involves their continued participa-
tion in the farm and seek confirmation based on a standard that is
appropriate for a noncorporate debtor.99 Approval of the plan will be
issued based on the plan's feasibility rather than creditor accept-
ance. 100 In short, the new Chapter 12 expands bankruptcy protection
to a class of businessmen whose particular problems were overlooked
under the Bankruptcy Code. As noted in the conference report re-
garding the new chapter, "[I]t is designed to give family farmers
facing bankruptcy a fighting chance to reorganize their debts and
94. Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
95. See Bland, Insolvencies in Farming and Agribusiness, 73 Ky. L. 795, 796
(1985):
A legion of factors, many beyond the control of the farmer, have contributed to
the agriculture recession which began in 1980. Those factors include liberal
lending practices from 1975 through 1981, high interests rates (21% in 1980),
borrowing based upon appreciated farm land values rather than upon the
farmer's ability to generate sufficient income, increased competition in the
world market, the grain embargo of 1980, severe drought in the crop year
1983, depressed farm commodity prices in 1984 and the dramatic increase in
the cost of fuel, fertilizer, chemicals and equipment.
96. See Anderson, An Analysis of Pending Bills to Provide Family Farm Debtor
Relief Under the Bankruptcy Code, printed in H.R. CONF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 132 CONG. REC. § 15076 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986); Martin, Bankruptcy
Judges, U.S. Trustees and Family Farmers Bankruptcy Act of 1986, 16 COLO. LAW.
221 (1987).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 1222(c) (1982 & Supp IV 1986). Chapter 12 protection inures to
any debtor that qualifies as a "family farmer." Family farmer means ". . . an individual
or individual and spouse engaged in a farming operation whose aggregate debts do not
exceed $1,500,000 and not less than 80 percent of whose aggregate . . . debt arises out
of a farming operation .. " A corporation or partnership may qualify if at least 50% of
the entity is owned by one family and the other requirements are satisfied. 11 U.S.C. §
201 (1986).
98. Adequate protection payments have been replaced by a "reasonable rent"
payment. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
99. 11 U.S.C. § 1225 (1986); compare 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). Confirmation of a Chapter 12 plan is identical to the confirmation procedure for a
Chapter 13 plan designed for individual debtors.
100. Once it is determined that creditors will receive, at a minimum, the amount
that they would receive in a liquidation proceeding, the emphasis in the confirmation
shifts to the debtor's ability to pay. Therefore, the confirmation procedure focuses on
what the debtor can pay the creditor rather than how much the creditor has as an out-
standing claim against the debtor.
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keep their land. It offers. . . the important protection from creditors
that bankruptcy provides while, at the same time, preventing abuse
of the system and ensuring that farm lenders receive a fair
payment." 10 1
Reasonable Market Rent
One of the most burdensome requirements of Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy stems from the adequate protection payment that section 361
imposes on the debtor.102 Farmers were required to make interest
payments to secured creditors based on the value of the collateral
which secured the loan. Theoretically, the payments shielded credi-
tors from the "lost opportunity costs" that accrued as a result of the
automatic stay.' 0 3 Chapter 12 eliminates this requirement, substitut-
ing a new formula for protecting creditors during this critical period.
Section 1205 states that adequate protection will be sufficient when a
plan provides "the reasonable rent customary in the community
where the property is located based on the rental value, net income,
and earning capacity of the property."'" 4
The "reasonable rent" requirement will make farmer reorganiza-
tion much more feasible. The provision reflects Congress' belief that
creditors are adequately protected when they receive fair market
rental value for their property as opposed to the full amount of their
original claims. 05 Clearly, the provision shifts the emphasis of the
Code from a wholesale protection of creditors to a position that sup-
ports them only to the extent that they have a realistic claim for
money owed. Henceforth, creditors will share the loss with the
debtor when property or collateral devalues significantly due to fac-
tors beyond anyone's control. 06
101. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H8999
(daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986).
102. i U.S.C. § 361.
103. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395; see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
104. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 1205, 132 CONG. REC.
H8991-92 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986). For example, a $300,000 loan secured by land that
was worth $300,000 in 1980 might now be a debt of only $200,000 due to the sharp drop
in agriculture prices.
105. Id. I I U.S.C. § 1205, 132 CONG. REc. H8999. ("section 1205 of the confer-
ence report makes it clear that what needs to be protected is the value of property, not
the value of creditors' interest in property.").
106. Most lenders opposed Chapter 12's enactment due to its debtor-oriented pro-
visions. Senator Peter DeConcini summarized the position of the chapter's opponents in
his statements on the Senate floor:
I am worried that the extremely debtor oriented provisions of this Chapter may
force our farm lender to write off hundreds of millions of dollars of farm debt
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Disposable Income
A debtor seeking confirmation of a plan under Chapter 12 follows
the same procedure established for individual debtors in Chapter
13.107 Secured creditors must approve the plan or retain the lien on
their collateral. 1°8 Unsecured creditors must receive payments
throughout the three year plan totaling no less than the value of
their claim.'0 9 If the plan provides creditors with less than full pay-
ment, the plan can still be confirmed if the farmer agrees to allocate
all of his disposable income to creditors. Thus, the disposable income
alternative equips the farmer with the flexibility that the absolute
priority rule of Chapter 11 effectively prohibits. Where crop prices
and property values have plunged to such an extent that a farmer
cannot realistically hope to pay off his creditors in full, the farmer
can still keep his farm.
Notably, this arrangement does not in any way jeopardize the
creditor's claim against the debtor. Essentially, the farmer will be
working throughout the plan's duration for the exclusive purposes of
paying back creditors and keeping the farm. He will not be able to
siphon extra profits out of the farm's yield since the Code allows him
to extract only those funds essential for basic maintenance."10
Therefore, Chapter 12 allows a farmer to stay in business in situa-
tions that would result in a liquidation under Chapter 11 with its
absolute priority rule. The new chapter recognizes that a plan that
provides for creditors to the greatest extent that the debtor's finan-
with no hope of recovering this debt when the farm crisis ends. The provision of
this bill that troubles me the most is the provision that will permit a family
farmer to go into bankruptcy, write down the secured debt to the current value
of the land, and then begin to pay the creditor based on what amounts to a new
mortgage based on the value of the farm. The thought that a person cannot
pay their debt and yet retain their property [sic] and only continue payments
based on the value of the property as the filing of the bankruptcy is entirely
new and dangerous. Why won't every farmer with a substantially undercol-
lateralized loan against his farm declare bankruptcy?
132 CONG. REC. § 15092 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
Other specialists have suggested that the law is actually a "legal incentive" to bankers
to negotiate settlements with financially-troubled farmers. Green, Farm Saga: Chapter
12 Tells of Hope, L.A. Times, June 23, 1987, at 14, col. 4:
Now lenders know that if a farmer isn't able to get a satisfactory negotiated
arrangement outside of bankruptcy, the farmer can file Chapter 12 and get
significant debt write down in most cases . . . that's made private lenders more
willing to accept write downs outside of court. It's changed the rules of the
game, and it has given farmers some clout in these negotiations.
Id., quoting David Aiker, University of Nebraska.
107. 132 CONG. REC. H8992 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986); compare I I U.S.C. § 1325.
108. 132 CONG. REC. at H8992-93.
109. Id.
110. The farm assets essentially become a trust fund for the creditor throughout
the duration of the plan. In other words, the business continues to operate so that credi-
tors will be paid back. The incentive for the farmer is that eventually the debts will be
discharged and that, once again, the farmer will be in the business.
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cial circumstances permit should not be dismissed simply because a
class of creditors objects.'' Creditors will always receive no less
than they would if a liquidation were forced on the debtor at that
time instead;' 1 2 given the disposable income provision, creditors often
will receive more actual dollars as a result of the plan. Therefore, the
farmer's reorganization does not harm or imperil a creditor's claim
against the debtor to any significant extent. It is virtually risk-
free. 3 In sum, the new chapter simply expands the usefulness of the
Bankruptcy Code to a type of debtor in dire need of the Code's re-
lief.114 The Code now has an expedient chapter for corporations(Chapter 11), consumer debtors (Chapter 13), and family farmers(Chapter 12). Why, then, is the Bankruptcy Code's usefulness being
denied to another equally deserving and desperate class of debtor,
namely, the individual operating a large business?
A PROPOSAL FOR AN AMENDMENT TO THE CODE
That farmers serve a valuable function to society and have a
strong lobby in Congress are the primary factors accounting for the
creation of Chapter 12.115 However, a multitude of individual busi-
nessmen that share the farmer's economic disposition still suffer
I i. A potential problem occurs when a class objects because the debtor's plan
proposes to use only their collateral in the continuation of the business. If the use of that
collateral endangers its value to a significant extent, yet no other creditors' collateral
would be imperiled by the plan's implementation, such creditors would appear justified in
their objection. The Comment does not address that situation for two reasons: (i) it is
unlikely that any business would have its fiscal organization structured in such a way
that only one piece or set of collateral would be at risk of devaluation by any plan's
implementation and (2) if such a situation arose, it is likely that the court would refuse
to consider it based on its inability to satisfy the basic good faith requirements of title 11.
112. This provision is the same as the best interest of creditors test (see supra
notes 43-44 and accompanying text) and the same as the confirmation standard for a
Chapter 13 petition. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
113. It is possible that the reorganization plan will fail, thereby making a liquida-
tion necessary. If the debtor's assets significantly decreased in value during the attempted
reorganization, then creditors will receive less for their claims than if the debtor had
been forced to liquidate initially. Additionally, some creditors, for personal reasons, may
prefer actual dollars immediately rather than an increased payment in the future. They
find repugnant the idea that they will be "better off" in the long run because the Code
precluded them from forcing foreclosure.
114. Chapter 12 includes a number of other provisions specifically geared toward
the family farmer: 1) a debtor is given 90 days to file his plan as opposed to the 15 day
requirement under Chapter 13; 2) a plan can be extended to five years when the situation
so warrants; and 3) farmers will be able to sell property of the estate that encumbers the
reorganization, and obtain post confirmation financing when they qualify. H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H8999 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986).
115. "The justification is, we need farmers. It's all interrelated." San Diego Daily
Transcript, Oct. 31, 1986, at 3A, col. I (quoting bankruptcy attorney Jerry Sims).
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from the inequities of the present Code. Sole proprietors, partner-
ships, and small family-owned corporations cannot practically reor-
ganize under Chapter 11, and fail to qualify for Chapter 13. These
business entities are no less valuable to society than the family
farmer. They provide jobs, services, and products to the mainstream
of America. In fact, they represent the strength and vitality of
American business and must be preserved whenever possible. If Con-
gress has designed bankruptcy reorganization law to foster the
growth and development of indebted business entities, as the enact-
ment of Chapter 12 clearly indicates, then the individual business-
man must be included.
As financial entities, these debtors resemble the family farmer in
every capacity."' Their businesses are their livelihoods and sole
means of support; rescuing their enterprises from liquidation means
much more than merely preserving a lost investment or job. Yet, like
the family farmer prior to the enactment of Chapter 12, these debt-
ors find little protection under the current Bankruptcy Code. Instead
of needed relief, these debtors are increasingly losing their businesses
when a single unsecured creditor decides to force a liquidation rather
than agree to a reorganization.
These debtors should have the opportunity to work out a plan that
will keep them in business while paying off creditors. A creditor who
refuses to compromise should not be allowed to force a business to
liquidate. Congress' creation of Chapter 12 for family farmers veri-
fies the existing Code's inadequacy in terms of providing a certain
category of individual debtors with meaningful bankruptcy relief.
Congress must go one step further and incorporate all individual
debtors into the Code's scope of coverage.
An amendment to the Code could be approached from a variety of
directions. 1 7 Perhaps the most expedient solution, however, lies in
extending the eligibility requirements of the new Chapter 12. Since
Chapter 12 is already geared toward the farmer as a sole proprietor,
a few minor changes could render it an effective tool for all bank-
ruptcies involving individual businessmen.
The primary aim of the amendment must be to eliminate the ab-
solute priority rule in bankruptcies involving a noncorporate
116. In terms of debt structure, the farmer might be slightly more overleveraged
than most sole proprietorships. Nevertheless, their financial problems and situations are
nearly identical.
117. Congress could create a new chapter under title 1I that specifically addresses
the nonfarmer individual debtor. Another option would be to amend Chapter I I so that
the absolute priority rule would not apply when an individual debtor was involved. Fi-
nally, Congress could stretch the eligibility limits of Chapter 13 to include these unpro-
tected businessmen within its scope. This Comment argues that an amendment to Chap-
ter 12 is the best solution because the other options involve shaking up preexisting
statutes which are appropriate for the purpose they are intended.
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debtor. 18 To a lesser extent, the importance of adequate protection
payments and other corporate-oriented features of Chapter 11
should be minimized. Chapter 12 has done precisely that for the
family farmer while maintaining an appropriate level of protection
for the interests of creditors. Creditors are protected because any
reorganization plan must provide them with, at a minimum, pay-
ments equal to that amount they would receive if the debtor were
liquidated instead. Additionally, they must receive all of the busi-
ness' disposable income. Finally, a trustee is appointed to oversee the
implementation of the plan and guarantee its integrity.
Interestingly, such an amendment would help clarify the purpose
of Chapter 11. Henceforth, only corporate petitions would arise
under Chapter 11, thereby alleviating the strain bankruptcy courts
now experience in resolving cases with a set of provisions that do not
seem applicable. Individual businessmen would have their own chap-
ter and not be expected to comply with a set of statutory require-
ments designed for publicly held corporations.
The chapter must be structured in a way that prohibits its use
where the debtor is an individual with several different businesses or
sources of income. Instead, its entire focus must be on the individual
debtor whose business represents his life and sole means of support
and who has a realistic chance of rebounding. Chapter 12 addresses
that issue with respect to family farmers by requiring that the
farmer to be eligible, must derive at least eighty percent of his in-
come from the farm business. 1 9 The eighty percent requirement
would serve the same purpose for other sole proprietors and should
be applied in the same fashion regardless of the business activity in-
volved. Assuming these debtors will make any reasonable sacrifice to
remain alive as financial entities, including compliance with the dis-
posable income requirement, the new chapter will give them a vehi-
cle to do so. In short, the new chapter should provide individuals,
motivated by the spirit and pride that operating a business engen-
ders, with a chance to reorganize. Congress should not discriminate
against nonfarmer individual businessmen; instead, Congress should
provide them all with a single expanded chapter.
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118. This was Congress' principle task in drafting Chapter 12, since this rule alone
accounts for most of the individual debtor's problems under Chapter 1 I. H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 958, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 CONG. REc. H8999 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986).
119. See supra note 97.
CONCLUSION
The existing Bankruptcy Code is in need of reform. A bankruptcy
proceeding should provide a debtor with a mechanism to reorganize
his business if it is practical to do so. Currently, only corporations,
under Chapter 11, and individuals with low debt totals, under Chap-
ter 13, find the Code advantageous. With the new Chapter 12 in
effect, family farmers are also covered. However, an entire class of
individual businessmen still face a myopic Code that is intolerant of
their needs or financial circumstances. The invariable result is that
the debtor's reorganization is sabotaged in its infancy by an obsti-
nate creditor.
The Code needs to be amended in order to absorb the other indi-
vidual debtors in need of bankruptcy relief. The amendment should
be structured in a way that provides the sole proprietor the chance to
reorganize without sacrificing the Code's ability to protect creditors.
Most importantly, it must operate to prevent an application of the
absolute priority rule in bankruptcies involving a noncorporate
debtor. The most efficacious way to accomplish this objective is
through an expansion of the eligibility requirements of Chapter 12 to
include all individual businessmen instead of just family farmers.
While the amended chapter should not allow every businessman to
stay in business simply because he desires to do so, the Code should
afford those debtors who have a practical plan and a realistic ability
to pay creditors the opportunity to reorganize. Otherwise, an individ-
ual that incurs any significant debt will have virtually placed the
jugular of his business within his creditors' hands. The chilling effect
that such a lack of protection has on free enterprise and courageous
investment cannot be understated. The individual businessman
forced to reorganize under a chapter that includes an absolute prior-
ity rule and adequate protection payments will have no practical
chance at cram down. Without the unanimous consent of his credi-
tors, the debtor's plan will be dismissed and the business dissolved.
The Bankruptcy Code should not remain in a state that empowers a
single junior creditor to wield the sword that kills a business. Con-
gress never intended title 11 to sanction that type of authority.
ANDREW D. SIMONS
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